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This chapter examines whether European Union (EU) member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) seek to advance democracy in Central Asia through the EU rather than, or apart 
from, bilaterally. Focusing on Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia, the analysis reveals that 
CEE countries appear unwilling to spend their scarce political and financial capital--be it 
bilaterally or at the EU level--to support democratisation in Central Asia, because it is not a 
priority region for them (at least not compared to the Eastern Partnership). They perceive the 
region as a difficult terrain for western-style democratization.  
 
 
Pushing the EU’s democracy promotion agenda further east? 
 
 
Central Asia has been only a peripheral area in terms of the foreign policy interests and priorities 
of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states of the European Union (EU), with 
their main foreign policy focus being the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. 
Yet, as part of a broader trend among the new member states in the last few years, several CEE 
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countries have been building stronger ties with Central Asia.
1
 Many of the new member states 
have been in the process of redefining their national foreign policy, manifesting an increased 
interest in bolstering ties with countries and regions beyond their immediate vicinity, including 
East Asia--particularly China--and Central Asia. This process is the result of a combination of 
factors, in particular the economic crisis and the pressures of globalization, which have urged 
CEE countries to expand their market opportunities, as well as the effects of ‘top down’ 
Europeanization,
2
  which have in turn facilitated a major overhaul of their foreign policies and 
pushed them to think about their national interests beyond their immediate borders. 
 
 
At the same time, CEE EU member states’ intensifying involvement outside their neighbourhood 
has been matched by the assumption of a more active role on foreign policy at the EU level. 
Since accession, CEE EU members have matured as policy entrepreneurs within EU foreign 
policy-making, in the sense that they no longer just ‘download’ foreign policy issues but are 
increasingly seeking to project their national foreign policy interests via EU institutions and to 
punch above their weight.
3
  Indeed, new member states also seek to ‘upload’ foreign policy 
interests onto the EU level.
4
 An illustrative example is Poland’s successful attempts at pushing 
for the Eastern Partnership and the European Endowment for Democracy. After a decade of 
institutional adaptation to the workings of EU foreign policy-making process, most CEE member 
states now master the game and are increasingly able to play along with the older and more 
established member states.
5
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Yet, research on the direct involvement and impact of CEE EU member states on the EU’s 
external policies, including democracy promotion, remains scarce.
6
 Apart from the Eastern 
Partnership area, where they hold a comparative advantage, there is very little knowledge about 
CEE countries’ contributions to EU policies towards regions further afield, including Central 
Asia. To better understand CEE’s role within the broader EU’s democracy promotion agenda, as 
well as the motivations behind it, it is imperative to take a look at broader patterns and dynamics 
behind CEE’s external policies and democracy assistance. This chapter does so by focusing on 
CEE member states’ activities within the framework of the EU’s policy towards Central Asia. In 
particular, it considers the role of CEE countries as democracy promoters and their reliance on 
the EU, if at all, to advance democracy in the region. 
 
 
Within the broader framework of this volume, Central Asia provides a valuable test case for 
exploring a range of possible explanatory factors, along the strategic-normative continuum, to 
account for the motivations behind CEE countries’ efforts to promote democracy. Moreover, it 
can serve to identify the conditions and mechanisms whereupon CEE countries infuse their 
foreign policy agendas with democracy promotion goals and activities. 
 
From a normative viewpoint, Central Asia presents a viable opportunity for CEE states to push 
for democratization in the region via EU channels. Given that the five Central Asian states of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were all part of the Soviet 
Union, the shared history and common economic links between CEE and Central Asia raise the 
expectation that CEE member states will have more pronounced foreign policy goals towards 
Central Asia than other EU member states which did not belong to the Soviet bloc. Moreover, in 
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trying to influence the EU’s democracy promotion agenda, especially in the context of the 
Eastern Partnership, CEE countries could be expected to attempt to weave their transition 
experience into the EU’s foreign policy.   
 
 
At the same time, since Central Asia poses significant strategic challenges to Europe, CEE states 
could perceive EU-led democracy promotion as a gateway to greater security. Arguably, given 
their location on the EU’s periphery and their closer geographical proximity and logistical links 
to Central Asia, CEE countries are  more exposed than the rest of Europe to hard and soft threats, 
including Islamic terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, as well as to the risk of regional 
instability resulting from the possible spill-over from Afghanistan.
7
 In addition, several CEE 
countries also have economic interests--including energy interests--in Central Asia and have been 
strengthening their economic ties with the region in the last few years.
8
 Hence, it is especially 
interesting to ascertain to what extent security concerns and economic interests may be informing 
CEE engagement in democracy support in regions beyond the Eastern neighbourhood.  
 
 
In the next sections the chapter outlines the theoretical assumptions underpinning the question of 
whether and why CEE countries may seek to rely on the EU to advance democracy in Central 
Asia rather than, or apart from, engaging in bilateral democracy assistance. To do so, the study 
draws on insights from the literature on Europeanization (of national foreign policies) and 
European foreign policy. The chapter then presents an empirical analysis of CEE democracy 
promotion in Central Asia, with the objective of establishing whether CEE countries have been 
seeking to leave their imprint on the EU’s democracy promotion policy towards this region. The 
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research draws on data gathered through document analysis and elite interviews with diplomats 
and officials from CEE member states and the EU institutions.
9
 The empirical analysis focuses on 
four CEE countries that can be considered ‘most-likely cases’. On the one hand, the chapter 
examines Poland, Slovakia and Lithuania. These three countries have been selected because they 
have been the most eager CEE states in seeking to promote democracy in the post-Soviet space.
10
  
On the other hand, Latvia has been selected because it is arguably the country with the strongest 
ambition to become more involved in Central Asia, both bilaterally and through the EU.
11
 If we 
do not find evidence among these four cases, according to the most-likely case approach, we can 
assume that the other CEE member states will also not attempt to leverage their membership in 
the EU to support democratization in the region. 
 
 
CEE Member States as (EU) Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs: Advancing Democracy in 
Central Asia through the EU? 
 
 
EU member states often attempt to project or ‘upload’ certain national foreign policies objectives 
onto the EU level because of the possible ‘amplifying’ effect. In so doing, they can ‘pursue and 
even expand foreign policy objectives (in specific regions or with regard to specific themes) 
beyond those attainable with domestic capabilities,’ which is particularly convenient for small 
states.
12
 If a state successfully manages to upload a national foreign policy goal onto the EU 
level, it can rely on budgetary, diplomatic and economic support from both EU institutions and 
other member states, allowing for that national foreign policy goal to be pursued more intensively 
and with a higher potential impact. 
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While it is generally acknowledged that EU foreign policy is highly subjected to the interests of  
large member states (in particular, Germany, France and the UK), some smaller EU member 
states, including Sweden or Finland, have already left a mark on the EU’s foreign policy and 
succeed in projecting their interests onto the EU level.
13
 EU membership has allowed them to 
follow a more ambitious national foreign policy course, backed by the EU’s political and 
economic weight and international standing.
14
 They have also benefitted strongly from the 
increased access to information and resources, which hugely exceed their own capabilities.
15
  
 
 
 
At the same time, while the benefits of promoting national foreign policy goals through the EU 
are apparent, member states also remain committed to the centrality of national sovereignty as the 
guiding principle that shapes their foreign policy. Moreover, as the EU’s legal competence in the 
area of foreign policy is still low, member states continue to pursue their foreign policy interests 
in parallel to, separately from, or even in opposition to the EU. The extent to which national 
sovereign imperatives operate in foreign policy is different in all 28 member states and varies on 
a policy by policy basis.
16
 
 
 
The study assesses Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia’s efforts to promote democracy in 
Central Asia and explores to what extent these efforts are channelled through the EU rather than 
–or apart from--bilaterally. Each case is embedded in an overview of the state’s overall relations 
with and foreign policy interests in Central Asia, including their trade relations, security and 
energy policies and development assistance. The analysis distinguishes between the different 
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democracy promotion instruments identified in this volume – diplomacy (persuasion, 
socialization, and pressure), assistance (technical and financial), conditionality (incentives and 
sanctions) and intervention (military or political, covert and overt coercion). In so doing, it tries 
to weigh the balance between strategic and normative motivations and approaches to democracy 
support.  
 
  
Poland 
 
 
Starting with Poland, in terms of strategic interests, its priorities in Central Asia lie with 
Kazakhstan, a close bilateral partner. Poland’s close relationship with Kazakhstan is driven by 
three underlying factors. To begin with, there is a small Polish diaspora in Kazakhstan of about 
50,000 people.
17
 Second, Poland has significant trade interests in Kazakhstan, which it seeks to 
pursue more intensively. In 2011, Polish-Kazakh trade amounted to more than USD 1 billion, 
about half of which consisted of Polish exports.
18
 Polish investments in Kazakhstan in 2011 
totalled USD 119.5 million. This brings us to the third factor, namely energy interests, as the 
Polish oil and Gas Company Petrolinvest is a major player on the Kazakh energy market, where it 
has been operating since 2006.
19
 
 
 
With respect to democracy and human rights, Poland has generally refrained from advocating a 
strong democracy agenda towards Kazakhstan as to preserve the close bilateral links. Warsaw has 
not publicly criticized the poor democracy and human rights record of the Kazakh government. 
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What is more, Poland has even voiced support for Kazakhstan’s government in the open. A case 
in point is the backing of Kazakhstan’s controversial bid to chair the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
20
 In a similar vein, Poland is usually reluctant to publicly 
oppose the Uzbek and Turkmen governments. Although Poland openly criticized the Uzbek 
regime’s heavy-handed crackdown on the Andijan protest in 2005,21 it joined Germany’s calls in 
2007-2008 to lift the sanctions imposed by the EU after the massacre. In the case of 
Turkmenistan, Poland sees it as a possible alternative provider of its gas supplies, given its 
energy independence on Russia. As such, the Polish government was a strong supporter of the 
Nabucco gas pipeline project, which--had it been built--would have brought gas from 
Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea to Central Europe.
22
 From this perspective, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Poland tends to be silent in public with respect to Turkmenistan’s democracy and 
human rights record. 
  
 
The remaining two countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are prioritized by Poland through its 
development assistance.
23
 In justifying the selection of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as recipient 
countries for Polish aid, the Polish government refers to the limited interest that other donors 
have shown for these two countries.
24
 Poland defines Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s development 
needs purely in terms of poverty reduction and does not refer to their need for political reform. 
For each recipient country three priority areas have been identified apart from the cross-cutting 
areas of democracy and transformation: self-governance and support for local communities; 
water and sanitation; and SMEs and job creation.
25
 In practice, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan receive 
little development assistance from Poland. This is not surprising, given that 60 % of Polish 
bilateral aid is reserved for countries of the Eastern Partnership, while the remaining 40 % is 
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allocated to 15 priority countries from Africa and Asia, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
26
 
Between 2007 and 2012, Poland implemented 11 projects in Kyrgyzstan as well as 11 projects in 
Tajikistan, worth about EUR 400,000 and EUR 600,000, respectively.
27
 This is only a fraction of 
the total amount of Polish aid--EUR 1.86 billion--distributed in 2007-2012.
28
  
 
 
More importantly, only a small percentage of Polish aid allocated to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
has so far aimed to support democracy and political transformation. Of the 11 development 
projects implemented between 2007 and 2012 in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the majority 
was in water management and rural development, with just a few, arguably insignificant, projects 
designed to foster democratic governance and develop civil society.
29
 However, it should be 
noted that additional funding for pro-democracy projects is channelled through Solidarity Fund 
PL, a Polish State Treasury foundation set up in 2001. Solidarity Fund PL, a beneficiary of 
international donors, including the Visegrad Fund and USAID, has been a vehicle for democracy 
assistance in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
30
 Substantively, the projects were aimed at training 
journalists and empowering independent media, civic participation and NGOs development.
31
 
Similar initiatives have also been organized by the Polish embassy in Kazakhstan--which also 
covers Kyrgyzstan--although on a limited scale. Recent examples include a visit of Kazakh 
journalists to Poland and a workshop in Kyrgyzstan on active citizenship in support of 
democracy.
32
 
 
 
Central Asia seems therefore to constitute an exception to a general rule: democracy and human 
rights are singled out as a cross-cutting area of Polish development assistance, alongside political 
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and economic transformation. Polish development assistance thus aims at ‘improv[ing] the 
functioning of state institutions, promot[ing] good governance, protect[ing] democratic standards 
and human rights, and build[ing] and enhance[ing] civil society.’33 On paper, 60 % of Polish 
development aid to the 15 priority countries from Africa and Asia is reserved for such initiatives. 
For the six recipient countries from the Eastern Partnership, a whopping 70 % is allocated to 
democracy and transformation.
34
 In the case of Polish aid recipient countries from Eastern 
Europe and the South Caucasus, the Polish government explicitly mentions that it ‘wants to foster 
changes that ensure long-term and stable functioning of democratic systems, respect for human 
rights and support for political transformation.’35  
 
 
Turning to Poland’s engagement at the EU level, the country has sought to influence the EU’s 
democracy promotion policy towards Central Asia in three ways.  First, it has been highlighting 
the issue of democratization in Central Asia through EU-sponsored conferences. An initial signal 
that Poland is keen–at least to some extent--to leverage its membership in the EU to advance 
democracy in Central Asia came during its Presidency of the European Council in 2011. At the 
annual European Development Days, jointly organized by the Council Presidency and the 
European Commission, Poland convened a High Level Panel (HLP) dedicated entirely to Central 
Asia. The HLP focused on ways in which the EU could combine economic development with the 
concept of deep democracy to advance development in the region.
36
 This approach fitted neatly 
with the overarching theme of the 2011 edition of the European Development Days, ‘Democracy 
and Development,’ a topic chosen in light of the Arab Spring and Europe’s response to it. At the 
conference, Poland also convened a HLP on ‘How to share transformation experiences,’ which 
featured then President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Roza Otunbayeva, as a high-level speaker.
37
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These initiatives at the European Development Days might indicate that Poland believes that the 
transition experience of the CEE member states could, or should, be shared with countries in 
Central Asia.  
 
 
Secondly, Poland has sought to leave its mark on the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in 
Central Asia by exerting influence on the work of the EU Foreign Affairs Council. Issues 
pertaining to the Eastern Partnership (EaP), Russia and Central Asia are covered at the Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (COEST) meetings, where Poland has been moderately active. While 
most COEST meetings on Central Asia feature little discussion, in sharp contrast to the COEST 
meetings on Russia and on the EaP, Poland has been slightly more vocal than other member 
states about democracy and human rights issues in Central Asia.
38
 A case in point is the enhanced 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Kazakhstan. Dissatisfied with the 
formulation of the clauses pertaining to human rights and democracy in the draft text of the 
agreement, Poland made annotations to the draft text in an attempt to upgrade the commitment to 
these principles.
39
 
 
 
Finally, the most noteworthy way in which Poland has steered the EU’s democracy support in 
Central Asia has been through the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). Designed in the 
wake of the Arab Spring to complement the EU’s existing instruments to promote democracy, the 
EED supports human rights and democracy activists and independent media in beneficiary 
countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) area. At the second meeting of the 
EED’s Board of Governors, held in June 2014, Poland presented a proposal to extend the EED’s 
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mandate to Russia and Central Asia.
40
 The Polish proposal to include Central Asia in the mandate 
of the EED reflects Poland’s belief that if democratic change does transpire in Central Asia, it 
will come from the grassroots level.
41
 Although the proposal was received with caution by other 
members of the board, at the board’s next meeting in December 2014 it was officially decided 
that the EDD’s geographical scope would be extended beyond the countries of the ENP and that 
2015 would serve as a pilot year in this regard.
42
 In an official statement it was noted that this 
new move is in line with the 2011 Council decision on the establishment of the EED, which 
states that the “Endowment will foster and encourage ‘deep and sustainable democracy’ in 
transition countries and in societies struggling for democratization, with initial, although not 
exclusive focus, on the European Neighbourhood.”43 
 
 
Lithuania 
 
 
Of the four countries examined, Lithuania has the least developed diplomatic relations–and thus 
seemingly the least pronounced strategic interests in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Lithuania’s 
interest in Central Asia has grown significantly over the last decade, driven by a combination of 
commercial and security motivations. From an economic viewpoint, financial pressures at home 
after the economic crisis have pushed Lithuania to explore business opportunities in Central Asia, 
especially in Kazakhstan.
44
 Bilateral trade with Kazakhstan has expanded considerably:
45
 in 
2013, the total volume amounted to EUR 590 million, of which three quarters were taken up by 
exports.
46
  If in 2001 Lithuania exported roughly 0.27% of its goods to Kazakhstan, that number 
had risen to 1.06% in 2012.
47
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuania’s trade relations 
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with the region have been mainly in the transit and logistics sector, owing to the railway system 
that connects Baltic Sea ports, including Klaipeda in Lithuania, with Central Asia. In the past few 
years, Lithuania has been eager to further exploit its commercial potential as a transit and 
transport hub with easy access to Central Asia. In 2012, it established a shuttle container train, 
which operates from Klaipeda to Chongqing in China, through Almaty in Kazakhstan.
48
 Apart 
from the transit and logistics sector, food products and second-hand cars currently make up a 
significant part of Lithuanian exports to Kazakhstan.
49
 Perhaps surprisingly, the Lithuanians – 
fully dependent on Russian gas–have shown little interest in the Central Asian gas market, as 
they are unlikely to benefit from any future gas pipelines running from Central Asia via the 
Caspian Sea to Europe.
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From a security perspective, Lithuania has pursued a close relationship with Central Asia by 
intensifying military cooperation. Via its defence attaché in the region, it has organized several 
joint exercises and signed military cooperation agreements. In 2013, for instance, Lithuania 
agreed on a military cooperation plan with Kazakhstan, which committed both parties to 
information exchange on security matters and involvement in multinational operations and 
military reform.
51
 Moreover, Lithuania often takes part in joint military exercises with 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the framework of the ‘Steppe Eagle,’ an initiative that 
serves to enhance the readiness of non-NATO peacekeeping units to participate in NATO-led 
operations.
52
 Lithuania has also engaged with Central Asia through NATO’s operations in 
Afghanistan. As a dedicated NATO member, it has contributed troops to the Afghan mission, 
proving that ‘NATO membership is seen by the Baltic nations as the foundation for their own 
national security, so NATO policy and concerns regarding Central Asia are fully supported by the 
Baltic states.’53 In addition, Lithuania–together with Latvia and Estonia--plays an important role 
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in NATO’s cargo traffic to Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), 
which runs from the Baltic ports overland to Afghanistan. 
 
 
In terms of bilateral development aid, in which Lithuania highlights democratization and 
transformation processes, Central Asia is not a priority region. So far, it has implemented only 
three projects in the region: in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, Turkmenistan in 2008 and Tajikistan in 
2009.
54
 In comparison, over the same period, Lithuania supported 235 development projects in 
Belarus, 226 in Afghanistan, 137 in Georgia, 81 in Moldova and 72 in Ukraine.
55
 In addition, the 
three projects in Central Asia have attracted little funding, of merely EUR 13,550 in total. Only 
one project was related to democratization: the Lithuanians provided legal training to help fight 
corruption in public education.
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  But given that the project cost only EUR 850,
57
 one can hardly 
speak of results. This stands in stark contrast to Lithuania’s heavy focus on democracy in 
bilateral development aid in general. In 2003-2013, 14 % of Lithuania’s bilateral development 
assistance in 2003-2013 went towards human rights and democracy, and 12 % supported civil 
society development.
58
 Yet only a tiny portion has been reserved for Central Asia.
59
 This reflects 
the observation that when Lithuanian leaders publicly speak of the need to spread democracy 
further East, into the other territories of the former Soviet Union, they hardly ever mention the 
Central Asian countries.
60
  
 
Lithuania’s apparent lack of interest in promoting democracy in Central Asia is reflected at the 
EU level, which has witnessed hardly any Lithuanian input into EU’s democracy support to this 
region.
61
 A notable exception has been the country’s role in annotating the draft text of the 
enhanced PCA with Kazakhstan. Like Poland, Lithuania was dissatisfied with the clauses 
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pertaining to human rights and democracy and therefore sought to upgrade the commitment to 
these principles in the draft text of the agreement.
62
 This seems to suggest that Lithuania, like 
Poland, does take an active interest in defending human rights and democracy in Kazakhstan, but 
that it thinks strategically about how to maintain its foreign policy focus on these issues without 
compromising its trade relationship with the country. In other words, the ‘closed’ nature of the 
EU decision-making process allows democracy champions like Poland and Lithuania to push for 
more democracy in authoritarian countries like Kazakhstan, where their main focus is trade, 
without endangering their bilateral economic ties. 
 
 
Slovakia 
 
 
Slovakia’s existing links to Central Asia are weak, as the region is not a foreign policy priority, 
even though its strategic interest in it has grown since EU accession.  Slovakia is mostly active in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As was the case of Poland and Lithuania, Slovakia mainly seeks to 
enhance its commercial presence there, especially in Kazakhstan. This became clear, inter alia, 
during the visits by the then Slovak President Ivan Gašparovič to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
April 2010 and the visit by the Speaker of the Slovak National Council to Kazakhstan in 2013.
63
 
In 2013, the volume of bilateral trade totalled around EUR 100 million, of which about four fifths 
were exports.
64
 In 2012, Slovakia exported roughly 0.10% of its goods to Kazakhstan, making it 
only its 47th trade partner in terms of export volume.
65
 
 Central Asia is also an attractive territory to explore energy sources, given Slovakia’s massive 
dependence on Russia for oil and gas supplies.
66
 As a transit country situated in Central Europe, 
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Slovakia supported the Nabucco gas pipeline project, as it would have benefited from Turkmen 
gas flowing into Central Europe. Likewise, in an attempt to diversify oil providers, Slovakia has 
sought to boost imports from Kazakhstan, among others.
67
 
 
 
In the security realm, Slovakia has forged partnerships in Central Asia, much like Lithuania, due 
to its involvement in NATO’s operations in Afghanistan. In the past decade, Slovakia’s Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs have met their Central Asian counterparts on several occasions–usually on the 
margins of large international meetings, in particular those of NATO, UN and OSCE--to talk 
about the situation in Afghanistan.
68
 In addition, Slovakia has engaged in so-called ‘soft’ security 
activities in the region, notably through its contribution to the OSCE’s work on international 
crisis management in Kyrgyzstan in 2013, considered ‘important in terms of strengthening 
Slovakia’s standing in Central Asia.’69 Following violent inter-ethnic clashes in South 
Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the OSCE initiated the Community Security Initiative (CSI), built around an 
international police advisory group based in the affected areas. The group supports the local 
police in dealing with the fragile security situation and restoring trust in the police. In 2013, the 
Slovak government contributed to the CSI by seconding one police advisor to the initiative. 
 
 
As for development assistance, while democracy support has been an overarching priority of 
Slovakia’s bilateral aid in the last decade, Central Asian countries usually benefit from support in 
different sectors.
70
 Similarly to Lithuania, Slovakia approaches Central Asian countries from the 
poverty reduction perspective. In 2003-2008, for instance, the region featured prominently in 
Slovakia’s development assistance: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were initially 
17 
17 
priority beneficiaries of Slovak aid.
71
 In that period, 17 projects were implemented in 
Kyrgyzstan, 11 in Kazakhstan and 5 in Uzbekistan.
72
 However, none of the assistance rendered 
so far has purposefully been used for democracy support.
73
 In Kyrgyzstan, aid mostly funded the 
development of high-mountain tourism, energy, waste management and social services. In 
Kazakhstan, most projects dealt with environmental protection, water management, ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol and development of the business environment. In Uzbekistan, the projects 
focused on environmental management, agriculture and land slide prevention.
74
 In Slovakia’s 
next development strategy, for the 2009-2013 period, Central Asian countries were downgraded 
to ‘project countries,’ together with 12 others.75 They stood apart from the three ‘programme 
countries,’ which would receive the largest share of Slovakia’s development aid, namely Serbia, 
Afghanistan and Kenya. As a result of this strategic shift, the number of Slovak projects in 
Central Asia dropped significantly to three, and of those that were implemented, none focused on 
democracy support. Only one funding allocation, for an agricultural development project in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan, which received EUR 103,000, was financially significant.
76
 Funding for 
the other two projects was almost negligible (EUR 440 and EUR 1,500).
77
 Slovakia’s latest 
multi-annual development strategy, for the 2014-2018 period, has even fewer priority countries–
in line with the OECD/DAC recommendation on aid effectiveness and the EU’s Agenda for 
Change, which do not include Central Asian states.
78
 
  
 
In contrast to Lithuania, however, Slovakia has also pursued activities in the field of democracy 
promotion in Central Asia, leveraging its membership in international organizations. Via the 
OSCE, for instance, it has participated in multiple election observation missions. In 2011, it sent 
two short-term election observers to the presidential elections in Kazakhstan, and also two short-
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term election observers to the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan.
79
 With regard to Kazakhstan’s 
bid to chair the OSCE in 2009, however, Slovakia took an overall ambivalent position: while it 
publicly supported the bid,
80
 most probably to avoid compromising its trade relations with 
Kazakhstan, it opposed it during EU members’ internal discussions held in preparation for the 
OSCE ministerial meetings, where the final decision on granting the chairmanship was to be 
made.
81
 In so doing, it sided with those member states, including the UK, Hungary, Slovenia and 
the Czech Republic, which felt that Kazakhstan was not ready to chair the OSCE before 
implementing democratic reforms. 
 
 
In sum, with the exception of its participation in election observation and monitoring, Slovakia 
does not engage in democracy promotion in Central Asia. The disinterest in advancing 
democracy in Central Asia through bilateral channels is mirrored at the EU level, with virtually 
no Slovak attempts at influencing the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia.82  
 
 
Latvia 
 
 
Latvia maintains a strong diplomatic presence in Central Asia and considers Central Asia a 
strategic priority, alongside the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.83 The interest in Central Asia is 
mainly driven by security and economic motivations.
84
 NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and its 
gradual phasing-out is a leading foreign policy issue.
85
 Like Lithuania, Latvia considers NATO 
membership the foundation of its national security and, by extension, it fully supports NATO’s 
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activities in Central Asia. Latvia is a leading actor in NATO’s cargo traffic to Afghanistan 
through the NDN, acting as an entry point for both an air supply line and a rail supply line. 
Latvia’s embassies in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan–used by NATO for transit from and to 
Afghanistan–have been operating as ‘NATO Contact Point Embassies’ to support the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and transit activities.
86
 Latvia also has 
other security concerns relating to Central Asia, mainly related to trafficking of people and drugs, 
as well as with respect to organized crime and illegal migration from Central Asia through Russia 
to Latvia. Therefore, Latvia has a direct interest in improving border management and drugs 
control capacities in the region.
87
  
 
 
As for economic interests, the NDN holds considerable economic benefits for Latvia, as it does 
for Lithuania, especially for the transport and logistics industry operating around its sea ports and 
Riga’s international airport.88 Latvia hopes that the transport corridor will in the future also be 
used for commercial cargos and seeks to further develop its potential as a transport hub for 
Central Asian exports. Like the other CEE countries examined here, Latvia’s main trade interest 
lies with Kazakhstan. In 2012, the trade volume amounted to EUR 112 million, with the country 
exporting roughly 0.53% of its commodities to Kazakhstan.
89
 Despite Latvia’s efforts to increase 
its exports to Kazakhstan, however, the trade balance remains negative, as Latvian trade with 
Kazakhstan is currently dominated by oil imports. In 2012, Latvian exports to Kazakhstan 
amounted to €47 million and imports to €65 million.90 Despite dependence on Russian gas, 
Latvia–much like Lithuania–has not demonstrated a direct interest in the construction of 
alternative supply routes from Central Asia via the Caspian to Europe, simply because it is 
unlikely that these pipelines would be able to supply the Baltic region. 
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Compared to the rest of the CEE countries, Latvia has not channelled its development aid into 
democracy promotion as extensively, so it is hardly surprising that it has not been doing so in 
Central Asia. Nevertheless, Central Asian countries have benefitted from Latvia’s limited 
bilateral development assistance,
91
  which takes up less than 10 % of its total aid allocation, 
amounting to EUR 17.9 million in 2013.
92
 Previously, Latvia’s development cooperation focused 
on the Eastern Partnership countries, particularly Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and 
Afghanistan. It was active in Central Asia as a donor before 2014, but its aid in the region did not 
go beyond a number of ad-hoc projects, including an EUR 70,000 scheme to improve the food 
and veterinary monitoring system
93
 and another one aiming to introduce the Portage early 
intervention system for children with special needs and their families, both in Kyrgyzstan.
94
 
 
 
As Central Asia recently graduated to a foreign policy priority, the region has now also become a 
priority target for development assistance. In one of its recent strategic documents, Latvia 
highlights that the Eastern Partnership and Central Asian countries are “foreign policy priority 
regions.”95 Moreover, Latvia claims that it ‘has unique advantages for cooperation with these 
countries (recognition, positive image, reform experience, language skills).”96 The government 
also wants to provide assistance ‘in areas where there is demand for Latvian expertise.’97Of the 
funding of EUR 213,800 that Latvia committed to bilateral aid in 2014, a considerable share was 
dedicated to Central Asia.
98
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Recent initiatives funded by development aid suggest that Latvia wants to start engaging in 
democracy promotion in Central Asia, at least in countries with some degree of openness. For 
instance, EUR 70,000 was committed to a grant competition for projects in Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova.
99
 The priority fields included good 
governance and the rule of law, and even civil society development, alongside a number of non-
democracy related areas, such as social protection, environment and rural development.
100
 The 
priorities, different per country, were seemingly attuned to realities on the ground. For instance, 
in Kyrgyzstan, the most liberal country in Central Asia, two of the three priorities were related to 
democracy promotion, namely good governance and the rule of law–including reforms in public 
administration and decentralization of finances–and civil society development. In Uzbekistan, the 
most authoritarian country of the three, none of the designated priority areas targeted democracy, 
but rather economic reforms, social protection, environment and education.
101
 In 2014, Latvia 
also launched a training programme for civil servants and civil society actors from the Eastern 
Partnership and Central Asian countries. Coordinated by the Riga Graduate School of Law, the 
programme aims at enhancing the capacity of public administration and civil society as well as 
promoting reforms through the transfer of Latvia’s experience and knowledge.102 
 
 
However, when it comes to national and EU-level diplomacy, Latvia has not been a vocal 
supporter of democratization in Central Asia thus far, although at the EU level this may be 
changing. It has previously been reluctant to openly criticize the political regimes in Central Asia, 
generally expressing support, rather than denouncing them. Like Poland, it backed Kazakhstan’s 
bid to chair the OSCE in 2009, and it joined Germany’s calls in 2007-2008 to suspend the 
sanctions imposed by the EU on Uzbekistan after the Andijan massacre.
103
 More controversially, 
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22 
rather than following other EU member states as well as the US in publicly condemning the 
Uzbek regime for its heavy-handed response to the protests in Andijan in May 2005, Latvia 
maintained close contacts with the Uzbek regime. Yet, the recent turn and growing interest in 
democracy assistance in Central Asia are already changing Latvia’s positioning in the foreign 
policy debates in Brussels. Following the turmoil that erupted in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 
2010, Latvia took the lead within the EU’s Council for Foreign Affairs in urging the other 
member states and the EU as a whole to call for elections in the country. Questioning the 
legitimacy of the provisional government, Latvia also noted that it was advisable for the EU to 
maintain relations only at the expert level.
104
 Importantly, Latvia’s pro-democracy advocacy was 
strongly linked to its interest in safeguarding stability in the region, as it called on the EU to 
approach the issue within a broader regional context.
105
 
 
 
Furthermore, early signals indicate Latvia is also likely to use its Presidency of the EU Council in 
2015 to raise the issue of democracy promotion in Central Asia. The region is one of the 
priorities of Latvia’s Council Presidency agenda, reflecting above all the country’s security 
interests. Latvia seeks to move the EU’s Central Asia policy forward in a number of areas, and in 
particular security, economy and energy issues, less so democracy promotion, except for civil 
society development.
106
 Like Poland, Latvia has partly dedicated a high-level EU conference to 
democratization in Central Asia. In charge of organizing the launch event of the European Year 
of Development, Latvia put the focus of a high-level panel at the event on the role of good 
governance and democracy in development cooperation, with particular emphasis on the cases of 
the Eastern Partnership and Central Asia. Within that context, it invited the Minister of Education 
and Science of Kyrgyzstan, Elvira Sarieva, to share her country’s experience with this topic 
23 
23 
during the panel.
107
 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that strategic motivations, 
mostly likely linked to Afghanistan, lurk behind these efforts.  
 
 
Latvia’s Presidency agenda is a clear case of an attempt to upload national interests to the EU 
level. Latvia admits that it seeks to rely on EU foreign policy mechanisms and instruments for 
Central Asia to pursue some of its foreign policy goals towards the region because it does not 
have the resources and capacities to achieve them on its own.
108
 Therefore, it actively seeks to 
influence the EU’s agenda by seconding national experts in areas where it has interests and 
expertise.  In the case of Central Asia policies, Latvia is keen on offering the country’s unique 
transition and reform experience to contribute to the implementation of EU assistance 
programmes in Central Asia, as it has been doing for EU programmes in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Moldova.
109
 Overall, in acknowledging that it has an important role to play in exemplifying to the 
post-Soviet states how a country can make it through de-Sovietization, democratization and 
marketization, Latvia has found an important niche for itself within EU foreign policy that links 
directly to democracy promotion.  
 
 
Explaining the Limited Involvement of CEE Democratizers in Central Asia 
 
 
The analysis above has found little empirical evidence that CEE member states are seeking to 
leave their imprint on the EU’s democracy promotion policy towards Central Asia. Even Poland, 
which has emerged as the pro-democracy champion at the EU level, has not been especially 
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active vis-à-vis Central Asia, with the notable exception of its proposal to extend the mandate of 
the European Endowment for Democracy. At both the bilateral and EU levels, CEE countries’ 
activities in support of democracy in Central Asia are rather limited, both in scope and in number, 
especially when compared to CEE democratisation efforts in the EaP region. 
 
 
Alhough there are multiple reasons behind CEE’s limited involvement in democracy promotion 
in Central Asia, and they vary from country to country, it is still possible to offer a preliminary 
explanatory framework. First, although CEE states all have specific foreign policy interests in 
Central Asia, the region is not a priority for them to the extent that the Eastern Partnership 
countries are.
110
 Therefore, although CEE countries perceive Central Asia as a source of security 
threats and instability, they are reluctant to invest their scarce financial and diplomatic resources 
in supporting democracy in the region, and in offering assistance more generally.
111
 These factors 
also explain their limited input in EU-level policies toward Central Asia. EU member states will 
normally try to project national preferences onto the EU when these concern issues that they 
consider very important.
112
 If this is not the case, they will not invest efforts in attempts to 
influence the EU on that matter. CEE disinterest in Central Asia is neatly illustrated by the fact 
that most CEE countries tend not to employ a separate staff member to follow EU policies toward 
Central Asia at their Permanent Representations to the EU in Brussels. Indeed, in many cases, the 
Brussels-based diplomat responsible for Central Asia also covers the Eastern Partnership 
countries. Since the latter are much more important for CEE EU member states, they take up 
most of the diplomat’s attention. 
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From a strategic viewpoint, most CEE governments prefer to avoid confrontation with 
authoritarian leaders in Central Asia on issues of democracy to safeguard their economic and 
security interests.
113
  This suggests that their normative inclination to defend democracy via 
foreign policy is overshadowed in Central Asia by interests in exploring the energy market and 
closer economic links, as well as by efforts to keep the authoritarian regimes on board in 
transnational security cooperation initiatives. However, it is important to highlight that CEE 
states behave differently at the EU level, in the sense that they tend to be much more critical of 
the Central Asian regimes in the ‘safe’ environment of EU debates, in contrast to the more 
cautious attitude assumed bilaterally. This could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt on their 
part to enhance their reputation as responsible and active players within the EU’s external 
policy’s framework as well as their role as pro-democracy actors. At the same time, it might 
indicate that CEE countries do want to speak up about human rights and democracy in Central 
Asia, but that they reflect strategically on how to do so in order to protect their interests in the 
region. Put differently, the ‘closed’ nature of the EU decision-making process allows democracy 
champions like Poland and Lithuania to push for more democracy in authoritarian countries like 
Kazakhstan without endangering their bilateral ties.  
 
 
From a normative perspective, CEE countries’ reluctance to ‘invest’ in promoting democracy in 
Central Asia is exacerbated by their belief that the region presents a challenging terrain for 
democratization to flourish based on their transition know-how.
114
 In contrast to their approach to 
the Eastern Partnership area, CEE states generally believe that they have little common ground 
with the Central Asian region.
115
 Therefore, these donors also worry that their transition 
experience–whether offered bilaterally or through the EU–will be of limited value to the Central 
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Asian recipients. Moreover, since Central Asia’s needs in terms of democratization pale in 
comparison to the basic development problems that the region is dealing with, CEE states believe 
that those should be addressed first.
116
 Offering development assistance to the region is thus 
considered more important than engaging in democracy promotion. Yet, although CEE countries 
have doubts as to whether there is a case for democracy support in the region at the moment, 
several of them believe that if democratic changes transpire, they will come from the grassroots 
level. Accordingly, they have been trying to encourage the EU to focus its democratization 
efforts in Central Asia on civil society, as reflected, for instance, in Poland’s proposal to extend 
the mandate of the European Endowment of Democracy to Central Asia. In addition, CEE 
countries believe that democracy assistance has the greatest chance to succeed in Kyrgyzstan, the 
most open and liberal country in the region, which is why they have channelled their limited 
bilateral democracy assistance towards this country.
117
  
 
 
Faltering democracy champions? 
 
 
The chapter examined the role of Central European EU member states in advancing democracy in 
Central Asia via the EU. Focusing on four ‘most-likely cases,’ namely Poland, Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Latvia, the analysis—defying the expectation emerging from the literature—
revealed that overall, CEE countries are not actively seeking to promote democracy in Central 
Asia, bilaterally or at the EU level. In explaining the overarching finding, the chapter pointed to 
several factors. Primarily, it seems that CEE member states are unwilling to spend their scarce 
political and financial capital to support democratization in Central Asia, not only because it is 
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not a priority region or because they wish to pursue ‘hard’ interests, but also because they feel 
that their limited resources would be wasted given their perception that western-style 
democratization would not find fertile soil in the region.  
 
 
What do these conclusions tell us about the role of CEE EU member states as foreign policy 
entrepreneurs and agents of democracy promotion, especially at the EU level? To begin with, 
CEE is not a homogenous group. Poland stands out as the only country that has sought to directly 
influence the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia. Hence, it could be argued that 
this case supports the assumption that member states will attempt to upload national foreign 
policy priorities onto the EU level, because membership can allow them to pursue and even 
amplify those beyond national capabilities. Nevertheless, it is important to note that even 
Poland’s involvement has been limited compared to its substantial efforts at uploading the pro-
democracy agenda for the Eastern Partnership to the EU level. The reason why Poland appears to 
stand out from the others thus can have more to do with its stronger financial and administrative 
capacity, including diplomatic staff.  
 
 
With respect to CEE countries as agents of democracy promotion, the findings of this chapter 
echo previous research done on the subject, which indicates that despite their ‘idealist’ reputation, 
advancing democracy abroad is a pragmatic approach to pursuing certain foreign policy 
objectives, especially in their neighbourhood.
118
 This explains why democracy support in a 
region like Central Asia falters in the face of ‘hard’ foreign policy goals, such as energy policy, 
security concerns and commercial interests. This puts CEE democracy promotion motivations 
28 
28 
firmly on the strategic end of the strategic-normative continuum, and makes it seem that their 
behaviour is not that much different from that of ‘older’ EU member states.  At the same time, 
the chapter found evidence of a distinct CEE approach to democracy assistance, which sets the 
countries apart from ‘older’ member states. CEE countries put strong emphasis on civil society 
support.
119
 Poland’s calls for greater EU involvement in Central Asia in this regard mirror earlier 
attempts by multiple CEE states for more civil society assistance in Eastern Europe, not least in 
Belarus, where many of them are directly engaged. The focus on civil society development shows 
that as new agents of democracy promotion, the CEE countries seem to be drawing on their own 
democratization experience.
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